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   2 
Introduction 
  Over the course of the last few years ethanol production has expanded at an 
incredible pace, putting strain on corn markets and transportation systems throughout 
the Midwest. Driven by the government subsidy and profit possibilities, firm entry 
rates have spiked. Previous to 2006-2007 the ethanol industry had been consuming 
feedstock dedicated to export, so little effect was felt by food markets. After 2007 
ethanol’s demand for corn will begin to weigh on food markets as reduced supply 
drives up prices. Corn supply is fast becoming a binding constraint to the ethanol’s 
growth rate. The feasibility of its further expansion hinges upon the growth and 
technological advances of corn production, along with the ability of the industry to 
function profitably without the subsidy.  
Opponents of this expansion often cite data which suggests a large net BTU 
loss during production; however, this data has been brought into question because 
much of it is from the 1980s. A survey of reports and articles on the issue indicate 
BTU input to output remains around 1:1. At this breakeven point both sides of the 
ethanol debate are capable of finding ways in which to highlight its environmental 
costs or benefits.    
Another determining factor for ethanol’s success is its long term 
competitiveness with gasoline. Typical consumers are fully aware of the reduced gas 
mileage ethanol produces, as such, ethanol prices levels must remain discounted at 
the appropriate rate to reflect the reduction. Currently it seems ethanol can not operate 
at these levels even while including the subsidy paid to producers. Advances in   3 
technology have been slowly eroding this lack of competitiveness but oil prices 
would still have to rise significantly to give ethanol an advantage at the pump.   




 The most often cited anti-ethanol report comes from David Pimentel. His 
argument against ethanol shows a net loss of 22,119 BTU per gallon produced 
(Natural Resources Research, 2003). Thus 29 percent more energy is required to 
produce ethanol than what the ethanol itself will yield. Pimentel’s argument for the 
total BTU requirement to produce a hectare of corn, however, is suspect. Many times 
he sights rather old data. Given the fourteen corn production inputs he details, nine of 
his figures are from 1980 and eight of those nine are instances where he sights his 
own work (Natural Resources Research, 2003, Table 1, p.128). Not included in his 
estimate is transportation cost which he later details to be around 5000 BTU/gal. 
Pimentel’s Table 2, which breaks down the total BTU input to produce a gallon of 95 
percent ethanol, not only uses old data, it draws on Table 1 for the input cost of corn. 
Excluding corn, there are seven inputs listed, of those seven figures, three are from 
1979, and one is again Pimentel’s own work.  
Pimentel also addresses the impact of co-products on the energy yield of corn 
ethanol. Given these co-products can readily be turned into DDG (dry distillers 
grains) and even corn oil, they offset the original figure from 29 percent negative 
yield to 20 percent (Natural Resources Research, 2003, p. 130). Another factor   4 
Pimentel addresses is environmental pollution caused by ethanol plants. His 
assessment of air pollution, backed up by a warning issued in 2002 by the EPA is 
vague, saying only “The EPA (2002) has issued warnings to ethanol plants to reduce 
their air pollution emissions or be shut down” (Natural Resources Research, 2003, p. 
130). The “Ethanol Plant Clean Air Act Enforcement Initiative” instituted in 2002 and 
the subsequent settlement with both Archer Daniels Midland and Cargill, the two 
largest ethanol producers, resulted in the direct reduction of 63,000 and 25,000 tons 
of air pollution respectively. In addition, the initial twelve plants investigated by the 
initive in Minnesota agreed to install brand new pollution control technology at each 
of their dry-milling facilities (EPA: Civil Enforcement, 2002). Pimentel shows the 
cost of removing the sewage waste to be around six cents per gallon of ethanol 
produced. The figures he uses for this calculation, including the Biological Oxygen 
Demand, a measure of water quality, are from 1984.  
  Graboski’s rebuttal to Pimentel (“A Rebuttal to…” 2002) centers around 
Pimentel’s use of out of date information as previously shown. Graboski details that 
inputs of energy in ethanol production have declined 15 percent since 1980 while 
“farm output has increased 33 percent.” Considering the vague nature of this 
statement and the lack of citation, further investigation shows it to be moderately 
supported by an April 2006 article from Amber Waves which states: “Over the past 
decade (1996-2005), U.S. corn yields averaged 138 bushels per acre, compared with 
115 bushels during the previous decade” (Amber Waves, 2006). This represents a 20 
percent increase in the past 10 years alone.    5 
  The June 2007 issue of Futures details the monumental task of trying to keep 
up with incredible growth in corn demand. In order to match the near 1 billion bushel 
demand hike for the coming year, an additional 6.5 million aces of corn must be 
harvested and the national average must be 153 bushels/acre. With the expansion of 
farmland into fringe areas, and an ideal season necessary, an average of 153 may be 
unrealistic (Futures,  2007).  
 
Alternative Feedstock and Advances 
Shapouri and Salassi’s feasibility report (2006) examines the possibility that 
sugarcane could be a competitive source of ethanol. After decomposing the cost per 
gallon cost to manufacture ethanol from various forms of fermentable sugar, they 
assemble Table-1(see Figures and Tables). The most competitive item is clearly 
molasses, having a total cost of $1.27 per gallon (vs. a total cost of $1.05 for dry-mill 
corn ethanol). The table is significant in that it shows the very high input costs for 
feedstock; a factor that explains much of Brazil’s success with ethanol. Considering 
feedstock prices are essentially exogenous, feedstocks that contain a higher ratio of 
processing cost are potential areas for cost reduction. This is almost a direct 
condemnation of the use of US sugar cane, in which feedstock costs account for over 
80 percent of production cost (Shapouri and Salassi, p. iv). Brazil used around 53 
percent of total domestic sugar produced in 2005 for ethanol production; this yielded 
4.2 billion gallons of Ethanol.   6 
Rendleman and Shapouri (2007) detail that almost all newly constructed 
fermenting plants are dry mills, so most new technology has been based on the dry 
process. Such technology includes the process of dry fractionation, which separates 
corn more effectively into its components without the soak step required by wet 
milling (BioFuels Journal, 2005d, 2005e). This fractionation helps the mill not only 
get more out of the high-starch part of the kernel; it gives the mill the ability to 
produce corn oil from a portion of the byproduct, and feed from the rest (Figure-2).  
Beyond simply selling the increased co-product the plant can lower energy 
cost by using the corn bran as a fuel source. At roughly $8/mmBTU for natural gas, a 
50 million gallon per year plant could save around $6,550,000 which translates into a 
13 cent reduction in production cost per gallon. This does not, however, address the 
issue of pollutants caused by burning the bran, or embedded costs in controlling such 
pollutants. Also another benefit to fractionation is that as the bran and germ are 
removed the cost of processing enzyme goes down. While the ethanol yield per 
bushel is slightly lower for a plant using this process (2.8 vs. 2.65 gal/bushel), the 
increased value of co-product easily makes up for this disparity (Shumaker, Luke-
Morgan, and McKissick, 2007).  
 
Recent Effects 
While it may seem the government subsidy for ethanol is far too high given 
the large profits being realized by production firms, the publication “Economics of 
Ethanol” by Purdue University sees this as a positive. Hurt, Tyner, and Doering   7 
explain that the continuation of the large subsidy has sparked a very high rate of entry 
into the industry, elevating it to a near gold rush status (Hurt, Tyner, and Doering, 
2006). The subsidy of 51 cents per gallon had been established when crude prices 
were hovering around $30/barrel. Areas that could reduce profits include a possible 
reduction of the subsidy and an increase in corn prices as more productive capacity is 
realized. Both of these scenarios would reduce profit margin and thus entry would fall 
off.  
Rapid effects on the Midwest can be seen in Stuefen’s examination of corn 
basis flow from 2000-2004. These effects seem to be telling for much of the region as 
ethanol production grows. There has been a large scale structural transformation in 
southern Minnesota and southeastern South Dakota. First, some background on basis 
and the region- Previous to 2000, the major corn markets had been located along 
Mississippi or Missouri River ports. Obviously, regions further away from such ports 
are at a geographic disadvantage. To remain competitive, producers must reduce their 
prices in an attempt to offset the cost of transport. Basis is calculated by subtracting 
the local cost of a commodity from the price at which it is being traded on the 
Chicago Board of Trade.  
The idea of basis is helpful in that it shows the extent to which a particular 
producer may be disadvantaged in a market along with effects from local supply and 
demand. Before 2000, high basis was characteristic of nearly all Minnesota and South 
Dakota (graphic-1). A more recent graphic of the area (graphic-2) shows a very 
distinct regional change, all of southern Minnesota and southeastern South Dakota are   8 
exhibiting a low basis. This tells use either local ethanol production has aligned the 
corn prices with CBOT futures prices or new construction on the region is having 
scale structural effects on transportation (Stuefen, 2005). Regional economics seem to 
dictate that beyond a distance of 50 miles the reduction in basis a producer gains from 
selling to an ethanol plant becomes negligible.  
The more corn stocks becomes diverted from export to ethanol production in 
the Midwest the more basis weakens in areas further from the Mississippi and 
Missouri rivers.  Figure-1 shows that this year, demand for corn from ethanol 
production will become greater than corn export. We can expect to see a further 
reduction in basis throughout much of the northern Midwest. The previously cited 
Amber Waves article suggests that as corn is diverted in greater amounts from export 
to ethanol production, countries such as Canada and Egypt with higher per capita 
income and moderate propensity for corn production will be more responsive to a 
subsequent increase in corn price.   
The overall market expectation seems to be that as all exportable corn stocks 
are consumed by the ethanol industry the food markets will begin to be affected. As 
this occurs the price of corn will rise, cutting profits and reducing ethanol expansion. 
This point should be reached by the end of 2008, after which it is expected the 
productive sector will only be capable of expanding at or below the rate at which corn 
production expands. This rate may be subject to acceleration as potential profits are 
now very high, creating an incentive for advancements in crop yield and production 
techniques. 





Eliminating the Subsidy 
Many opponents of ethanol argue the industry becomes no longer feasible 
after the elimination of the subsidy. With differing figures that can be proven both 
true and false currently; as was previously shown. This means, to a large extent, the 
industries future is closely related to changes in petroleum price. Given that 
petroleum price is tied to supply-side decisions from organizations such as OPEC, its 
interesting that many political figures have hailed ethanol as a way to end dependence 
on foreign oil. It is public knowledge that ethanol produces a mpg rating roughly 25 
percent less than traditional gasoline. For ethanol to then be competitive it should be 
roughly 25 percent cheaper than gasoline, however, we do not currently observe this 
nationwide. The only states hovering around the 25 percent or better mark are 
Wisconsin, South Dakota, and Colorado; the national average is around 15.3 percent 
cheaper as reported by e85prices.com.  
Interestingly enough, in an AP announcement on June 17
th 2007, many large 
oil companies are opting to cut back on newly planned refinery construction in light 
of ethanol’s expansion. Given ethanol is just coming out of its infant industry phase, 
game theory would dictate oil’s best chance of fighting its expansion would be to 
expand capacity, lower prices, and undercut ethanol by eliminating the difference in   10 
prices. Considering people are fully aware of ethanol’s reduced gas efficiency, oil 
could easily win a pricing battle.  
The subsequent increase in gasoline prices will have an effect on ethanol 
prices as E85 still uses 15 percent gasoline. Producers expect demand to remain 
relatively flat over the next few years as more consumers begin to migrate away from 
oil. This may not be a realistic expectation, as a developing China will create a much 
larger demand than in past years, causing oil prices to rise. The subsequent increase in 
E85 prices will be much smaller causing the price gap to increase above 25 percent, 
making ethanol a much more attractive gas alternative.   
The current subsidy has created the opportunity for incredible profit by the 
various large production firms and has caused a considerable expansion of the market. 
While this has been good for the industry in the short term its benefit obviously 
declines over the long term. The issue then becomes: what is the best way to 
eliminate the subsidy without bankrupting the industry? There is little risk of short 
term detriment to the consumer because gasoline is always available as a substitute. 
The most obvious way to begin is a phased reduction of the subsidy until it is 
completely gone. An important aspect of this method is a clear report of what each 
phase would entail and an appropriate amount of time to give the industry an 
adjustment period.  
  The current figures show the industry should end up operating around the 
breakeven point given gas prices moderate or even increase over the adjustment 
period. This will also create even larger incentives for technological advances 
pertaining to cost reduction or efficiency. Firm entry should also slow to a rate more   11 
in line with the year-to-year corn production rates. The general sentiment seems to be 
that by 2012 cellulosic ethanol production will become feasible at current petroleum 
prices. The most efficient and effective time at which to begin cutting the ethanol 
subsidy would appear to be around 2010, this would also put an appropriate amount 
of pressure on firms to fully realize cellulosic production. 
 
Examining the Cost 
  The International institute for sustainable development estimates the current 
ethanol subsidy to cost around $1.05-$1.38/gallon. With a current production capacity 
of roughly 7 billion gallons per year this amounts to 7.35-9.66 billion dollars per year 
in direct ethanol subsidies. It’s hard to say whether or not this will be a worthwhile 
investment for America to be making over the long run without seeing the return on 
investment that may be present. The structural changes occurring in the Midwest as a 
direct result of ethanol’s expansion seem to be having a positive effect on the corn 
markets at the very least. The weakening basis displays that producers in more remote 
regions are no longer at the disadvantage they previously were. New train and 
transport systems are bringing the prices into line with national averages.   
  Co-product technology is also on the rise; processes such as fractionation are 
helping to yield a greater quantity of co-product while also reducing cost. Considering 
this is one of the major sources of profit for ethanol production facilities this is very 
important. Previously, it was though that as more corn was diverted to ethanol 
production, feed cost would rise drastically. This may not hold true as the most 
prominent of the co-product is distiller’s dry grains with solubles (DDGS). Demand   12 
for DDGS has increased rapidly since it has become a popular replacement for corn 
and protein in cattle diets and more recently in the diet of poultry as well (Amber 
Waves 2005). The sale and movement of co-products is also being aided by the 
proximity of production facilities to dairy and beef farms throughout the Midwest.       
 
Viability of Alternatives 
  Corn alternatives are currently uncompetitive as their feedstock costs are too 
high. We know as time progresses that technological advances will lower costs and 
increase output for any process; however, input prices thus far seem relatively 
stagnant for two reasons: first, as there has been no overwhelming demand increase 
for alternative feedstocks due to their relatively high cost, prices have remained flat. 
Second, demand for corn feedstock has not eaten through the total amount previously 
slated for export. Once that occurs, which will likely be this year, corn feedstock 
prices will rise as they begin to compose a larger proportion of ethanol production 
cost. This will translate into higher ethanol cost at the pump and less opportunity for 
production facilities to reduce cost from their end. This is one of the main issues with 
the incredible demand created by the subsidy, increases in corn production rates that 
would have previously resulted in a cost reduction are simply being used to satisfy the 
ever growing demand as more ethanol plants come online.  
  As corn prices rise, along with ethanol prices, refining molasses may actually 
become an attractive option considering it is only 22 cents more expensive to produce 
than corn. Growth of this industry is directly dependant upon the fluctuations of both 
corn price and oil price. The lack of co-products, however, is limiting as much of the   13 
revenue facilities generate is a direct result of their ability to effectively create DDGS 
for sale to nearby farms and use corn germ as a fuel source to reduce energy costs.       
Common Sense 
  One of the principals of economics is that the cost of something is what you 
give up to get it; this of course includes opportunity cost. If, for example, you were 
trying to decide whether you should fix your computer yourself or bring it to a repair 
shop, your decision would involve an analysis of your time. Not only the time it 
would take to fix, but the time it may take to read up on the particular repair, or the 
cost of a pc repair course. In the ethanols case some of the non-pecuniary costs 
associated with this large scale project include the energy and pollution required to 
build and maintain production facilities, the extra cost associated with building E85 
compatible vehicles, potential repercussions of supply side decisions from such 
organizations as OPEC, and the cost of maintaining a large transportation network to 
aid the movement of feedstock. Obviously not all results are negative; some can be 
seen as investments, such as a new transportation network or expanded farmable 
acreage.  
The two most important questions are clearly- is it worth it now?, and will it 
be worth it later?. Is it worth it now is relatively easy to answer considering without 
the subsidy the ethanol industry would have serious difficulties turning a profit 
despite the fact that ethanol is only around 15 percent cheaper than gasoline 
nationwide when it should be around 25 percent cheaper. Clearly the answer is no. 
Will it be worth it later is the more interesting question. Most politicians seem to 
think the answer is easily yes, sighting that ethanol is a renewable source of energy   14 
and will end our dependence on foreign oil. The problem being that ethanol will not 
have a majority market share in the foreseeable future so America will still be 
dependent on foreign oil. Also there is a large difference between ethanol being 
profitable and ethanol being economically profitable. Given the sum of all the 
subsidies, investment in production facilities, transport, technological research, 
wages, etc ethanol would have to be wildly successful and profitable to offset this 
amount, not to mention taking into account the next best way the money invested 
could be used.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Currently, ethanol is uncompetitive and inefficient on many levels. There is 
little empirical evidence to show a net BTU gain from its production even with the 
addition of DDGS co-product. An unbiased comprehensive study in the current 
production environment is necessary to illustrate total net gain or loss, as many new 
technologies have arisen recently which significantly change production yields and 
cost. It may hold true that the costs associated with fundamental transitional and 
structural changes throughout the Midwest represent the true underlying cost of 
ethanol’s expansion. The reduction of basis should continue in coming years. More 
production facilities will come online, giving corn producers in remote areas markets 
in which their corn can sell for closer to the national average.  
Food prices and corn prices will rise in the near future as corn that was 
previously used for food production is demanded by the ethanol industry. Also, as 
farmland is converted from crops such as wheat to corn in an attempt to meet demand,   15 
prices of food products derived from wheat will also rise. This is important because 
an increase in input price for production facilities will be transferred to consumers 
through higher per gallon prices. Considering the pending price increase, ethanol will 
become even less competitive, forcing consumers to substitute towards gasoline. This 
analysis does not even take into account a decrease in the government subsidy which 
would make production an even less attractive idea.  
Ethanol seems to have reached a breaking point, while politicians hail it as an 
end to foreign oil dependence, the reality of the situation is grim. Without 
technological advance forthcoming the industry as a whole will be fully reliant upon 
the government subsidy to at best breakeven. While this does depend on the scale of 
price movements, without significant advances, production will become less and less 
profitable in the coming months and years, and in its wake will cause high inflation 
across food and grain markets.       
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(Stuefen, December 2005, p. 6)   Darker shading indicates higher basis. 
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       Graphic-2 
 
(Stuefen, December 2005, p. 7) 
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Figure 1 (George A. Shumaker, Audrey Luke-Morgan and John C. McKissick, P. 17) 